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Countries across Europe developed a range of data-
base systems to register pandemic influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 cases. Anecdotal reports indicate that some 
systems were not as useful as expected. This was a 
cross-sectional, semi-structured survey of health pro-
fessionals who collected and reported pandemic influ-
enza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases in 23 countries within the 
27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway. 
We describe here the experiences of using pandemic 
case register systems developed before and during the 
pandemic, whether the systems were used as intended 
and, what problems, if any, were encountered. We 
conducted the survey to identify improvements that 
could be made to future pandemic case registers at 
national and EU level. Despite many inter-country 
differences, 17 respondents felt that a standardised 
case register template incorporating a limited num-
ber of simple standard variables specified in advance 
and agreed between the World Health Organization 
and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control could be useful. Intra- and inter-country work-
ing groups could facilitate information exchange, 
clearer system objectives and improved interoperabil-
ity between systems.
Introduction
After the Single European Act of 1986, the European 
Commission pushed for better collaboration between 
national sentinel systems for infectious disease sur-
veillance, establishing ‘Eurosentinel’ in 1989 [1]. This 
international sentinel network of general practition-
ers included surveillance of influenza-like-illness (ILI) 
and acute respiratory infection (ARI). Since then, ILI 
and ARI surveillance have become well established in 
Europe and many European Union (EU) Member States 
have developed sophisticated surveillance systems for 
influenza and other infectious diseases [2-4]. Since 
September 2008, national ILI/ARI data, virological data 
and other indicators from all 27 EU Member States plus 
Iceland and Norway have been reported on a weekly 
basis to the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC). The novel influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
pandemic of 2009 posed a range of new challenges, 
however [5], and evaluations of pandemic preparedness 
and response are still ongoing at regional, national 
and multinational level. Many focus on the high-level 
strategic management aspects of the pandemic, while 
others look more specifically at vaccination and anti-
viral strategies, surveillance, communications and 
cross-sectoral working [6]. In this survey, we focus on 
the challenges encountered with both new and estab-
lished pandemic influenza case registration systems 
by the professionals within public health institutions of 
EU Member States and Norway, who were charged with 
collecting, analysing and reporting on the 94,512 influ-
enza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases in the first three months of 
the pandemic [7] (and many more thereafter). 
The rationale for this study was the experience with 
case registration in the Netherlands, heretofore unde-
scribed: at the onset of the pandemic, a newly devel-
oped data warehouse known as Pandora (Pandemic 
Research Application) was trialled as a pandemic case 
register. Pandora was originally developed in response 
to the avian influenza A(H7N7) outbreak that occurred 
in the Netherlands in 2003 [8]. It was designed to facili-
tate outbreak control and research through comprehen-
sive data collection from clinical, laboratory, hospital, 
public health and agricultural sources and also to facil-
itate data linkage at an individual level. It was not fully 
operational at the onset of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
pandemic and the operating system failed when it was 
used as a real-time case registration system. It had to 
be abandoned in the early phase of the outbreak, but 
was later used successfully to record hospitalisation 
data during the pandemic and is now operational and 
on standby for avian influenza outbreaks, as originally 
intended. 
Anecdotal reports indicate that in some other European 
countries, complex database systems were also devel-
oped to register influenza cases that were subse-
quently not used at all, not used immediately, or did 
not provide the necessary information during the pan-
demic. We hypothesised that countries using case 
registers that were well established pre-pandemic 
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were less likely to experience problems scaling them 
up than those that developed new systems. Our aim 
was to ascertain whether other countries successfully 
managed comprehensive data linkage within their pan-
demic case register and whether a single system could 
successfully meet the competing information needs of 
stakeholders. Our objectives were to describe – from 
the perspective of the system user – experiences 
of using pandemic case register systems developed 
before and during the pandemic, whether the systems 
were used as intended during the pandemic and what 
problems, if any, were encountered. The survey was 
conducted with a view to identifying improvements 
that could be made to future pandemic case registers 
at national and EU level. 
Methods
A cross-sectional survey was conducted in June and July 
2010, which included 30 countries within 27 EU Member 
States (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
were approached separately) plus Norway. Fellows 
who were training with the European Programme for 
Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET), placed at 
national centres for surveillance and control of commu-
nicable diseases across the EU, identified one senior 
person in their institute with direct experience of the 
pandemic case registration system in that country. 
Following initial email contact, two follow-up reminder 
emails were sent, and if no response was received, the 
EPIET fellow recommended an alternative contact per-
son. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity, unless 
the respondent gave permission for their country to be 
named.
The survey was conducted by electronic questionnaire 
using QuestBack software [9]. Questions, in English, 
related to the purpose and content of the case reg-
istration system (objectives, data sources, data col-
lected and means of collection), professional groups 
involved (in developing the system and data collection, 
aggregation and reporting), necessary adaptations 
and ultimately a description of the systems used, prob-
lems encountered and lessons learnt. The question-
naire was first piloted with four senior, multilingual 
health professionals working in national public health 
institutes across Europe for whom English is not their 
first language. It was semi-structured and divided into 
two sections: (i) relating to the pandemic influenza 
case register in place before pandemic phase 4 was 
declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 
27 April 2009 and before the first case of influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 was confirmed in their country (hereaf-
ter referred to as ‘pre-pandemic’) and (ii) relating to the 
pandemic influenza case register or other additional/
supporting systems or software used after the first 
case was confirmed. Sections i and ii comprised 15 
and 10 questions, respectively, and the questionnaire 
took approximately 10 minutes to complete. Response 
options were dichotomous (yes/no), Likert-type scales 
and open-text fields. Descriptive analysis was con-
ducted on qualitative data. 
Using the approach of Baker et al. [10], case register 
objectives were classified as control focused or strat-
egy focused. They were considered control focused 
if they were necessary for the monitoring and man-
agement of healthcare systems and other services 
Figure
Flow chart of 23 respondent countriesa in survey on case registry systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Europe 
and their status regarding having a pandemic influenza case register pre-pandemicb, June–July 2010
a Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Scotland, Slovakia and Sweden.
b  ‘Pre-pandemic’ refers to before pandemic phase 4 was declared by the World Health Organization on 27 April 2009 and before the first case 
of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was confirmed in their country.
Countr ies with no pandemic influenza 
case register   in  place pre-pandemic 
Group 3 
n=6 
Countr ies with an operational  
pandemic influenza case register  
in  place pre-pandemic 
n=17 
Countr ies that  adapted a pre-exist ing 
case register   pre-pandemic  
Group 1   
n=6
Countr ies that  developed a new 
case register  pre-pandemic 
Group 2 
n=11 
Responses received 
n=23
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internally within the country. Objectives were classed 
as strategy focused if they supported prevention strat-
egies to reduce population health risk. Control-focused 
and strategy-focused objectives are, of course, not 
mutually exclusive and one can inform the other. 
Univariable analysis (using Pearson chi-square test) 
was conducted using Stata 11.1. Probability of p≤0.05 
was considered statistically significant. 
Results
Of the 31 countries contacted, 23 responded to the 
questionnaire: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, England, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Scotland, 
Slovakia and Sweden. Six respondents were heads of 
department (at an epidemiology or surveillance of infec-
tious diseases unit) nationally or at state level, seven 
were epidemiologists and four were public health doc-
tors or medical officers. Nine described their principle 
role as one of coordination or management within their 
department, and about half of the respondents (n=12) 
had a responsibility in relation to surveillance, data 
analysis and reporting. Only one respondent reported 
a role in making recommendations and one described 
a role in public relations. 
A total of 17 responding countries reported having an 
operational pandemic influenza case registration sys-
tem in place pre-pandemic, of which 11 developed a 
new system in advance and six adapted an existing 
register, including the seasonal influenza registration 
system (n=3) and other infectious disease surveil-
lance systems (n=2). Six countries did not have a pan-
demic influenza case register prepared pre-pandemic 
(Figure). We divided responding countries into terciles 
based on per capita gross domestic product, but did 
not find any difference in countries’ state of readiness 
whether they had a system in place pre-pandemic or 
not (data not shown). 
Countries with an operational 
pandemic influenza case register 
in place pre-pandemic (n=17)
Countries with a pandemic influenza case register 
in place pre-pandemic were divided into those that 
adapted an existing system (n=6, Group 1) and those 
that developed a new one (n=11, Group 2). All 17 of 
these countries reported that clear objectives were 
defined in advance (Table 1). All respondents reported 
at least one control-focused objective and one strat-
egy-focused objective, but Group 1 countries were 
more likely than those in Group 2 to report ‘to inform 
strategies to prevent/reduce mortality and morbidity’ 
as an objective (Pearson chi-square statistic: 3.61; 
p=0.05). 
Involvement of experts in the development of the regis-
ter was variable (Table 1) and no statistically significant 
Objectives of case register and 
professional groups involved in its 
development
Number of 
respondent 
countries n=17
Objectives specified (answered by the 17 countries)b
Control-focused objectives
To count cases and track the number 
of cases occurring over time 16
To track cases geographically 15
To follow individual cases over 
time, documenting outcome (death, 
hospitalisation, etc.)
15
To conduct contact tracing 11
Strategy-focused objectives
To inform strategies to prevent/
reduce mortality and morbidity 13
To maintain virological surveillance 12
To record detailed information about 
all cases 11
To record detailed information about 
early cases only 9
Otherc 3
No clear objectives specified 0
Professional groups involved in developing the register 
(answered  by the 17 countries)b
Epidemiologists 16
Information technology specialists 
(health-/public health-focused) 12
Health/public health specialists (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 10
Laboratory experts (e.g. virologists) 8
Infectious disease doctors 8
Health service managers/planners 6
Information technology specialists (non-
health related) 4
General practitioners 4
Other 0
a  Pre-pandemic refers to before pandemic phase 4 was declared 
by the World Health Organization on 27 April 2009 and before 
the first case of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was confirmed in their 
country.
b  Multiple answers were possible.
c  Other objectives were: to collect symptoms, travel history, 
demographics and treatment provided, to record detailed 
information about fatal cases with  influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, 
and to monitor antiviral therapies and vaccination status 
among cases and to estimate transmission parameters and 
effectiveness of interventions.
table 1
Respondent countries with a pandemic influenza case 
register developed pre-pandemica (n=17): objectives and 
professional groups involved in its development, survey 
on case registry systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 in Europe, June–July 2010
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difference was found between the involvement of the 
various professional groups.  
Data sources and data collection 
Data sources used, means of data entry and state 
of readiness for use are reported by group in Table 
2. There was no statistically significant difference 
between Groups 1 and 2 in the number or nature of data 
sources accessed or the means of data entry. Where 
data were entered manually, software used included 
EpiData (n=2), Microsoft Excel (n=2), Microsoft Access 
(n=2), dBase (n=1) and MySQL open source database 
[11] (n=2). 
Four respondents in Group 1 provided details of their 
country’s register (Box 1). Brief descriptions provided 
by respondents in Group 2 are in Box 2. 
System readiness pre-pandemic
In five of the six respondent countries that adapted a 
pre-existing case register before the pandemic (Group 
1), the systems were live and ready for use pre-pan-
demic. In countries where the system was not ready for 
use immediately on confirmation of the first case in the 
country, the system was ready within five days in one 
country, within 30 days in two countries (paper records 
were kept until the system was ready in one country) 
and within two months and six months for recording of 
cases and deaths, respectively in one country. 
Necessary system modifications
Overall, 16 of the 17 countries with an operational pan-
demic influenza case register in place pre-pandemic 
reported that they used their new or adapted system 
during the pandemic (one country had to abandon their 
Development of case registers 
Number of respondent countries n=17
Group 1
Adapted pre-existing case register 
before pandemic 
(n=6)
Group 2
Developed new case register before 
pandemic 
(n=11)
Data sources usedb
Laboratory reports 6 10
National notifiable infectious disease database 6 6
Hospital admission information 5 7
Regional case reports 3 6
Sentinel network of physicians 4 4
Other 0 2
Means of data entry
Entered automatically 1 3
Entered manually 2 1
A combination of both of the above 3 7
State of readiness
Was the system live and ready for use before the 
World Health Organization declared pandemic phase 
4 (27 April 2009)?
Yes 5 2
No 1 6
Was the system live and ready for use before the 
first influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 case was confirmed in 
your country?
Yes 5 8
No 1 3
Modification of the register
Was the case register modified at any point?
Yes 1 7
No 5 3
a  Pre-pandemic refers to before pandemic phase 4 was declared by the World Health Organization on 27 April 2009 and before the first case 
of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was confirmed in their country.
b  Multiple answers were possible.
table 2
Development of case registers pre-pandemica by 17 respondent countries (Groups 1 and 2) during the influenza pandemic, 
survey on case registry systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Europe, June–July 2010, June–July 2010
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new system during the pandemic because it could not 
be adapted to the new situation in time). In Group 1 
(countries that adapted a pre-existing case register 
before the pandemic), five of the six respondent coun-
tries were able to use their system effectively without 
modification. In Group 2 (countries that developed a 
new case register before the pandemic), seven of the 
11 respondent countries had to modify the system after 
a variable number of cases were confirmed (mean: 418 
cases; range: 1–1,200). Reasons for modifying or aban-
doning the system are in Box 3. There was no statis-
tically significant difference between the professional 
groups involved in system development and successful 
implementation of the system.
Of the 17 countries with an operational pandemic influ-
enza case register in place pre-pandemic, 12 reported 
using more than just the case register. Other systems 
used in tandem with the case register were Microsoft 
Excel (n=4, which one respondent reported was used 
to record the very earliest cases before switching 
Box 1
Overview of case registration systems, provided by four 
respondent countries in Group 1a, survey on case registry 
systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in 
Europe, June–July 2010 
Germany
In Germany, the multistate electronic reporting system for 
communicable diseases (SurvNet [12]) was used. This is a 
physically distributed, dynamic database used by all local 
health departments, state health departments and the Robert 
Koch Institute, the national agency for infectious disease 
epidemiology. The database is characterised by a number 
of highly standardised, core questions, but it incorporates 
responses to questions in free-text format in order to obtain 
additional information about risk factors, therapy, etc. from 
cases. 
Sweden 
A detailed description of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 surveillance in Sweden is available [13]. Briefly, a 
comprehensive regional/national system for communicable 
disease surveillance called SmiNet-2 has been developed 
[2]. This web-based system allows for reporting from 
physicians (via an online form) and laboratories (directly 
from the laboratory data system).  Random, population-
based reporting was also conducted in Stockholm via a 
telephone- or Internet-administered cohort study (‘SickReport’, 
described in detail elsewhere [3]), in which approximately 
5,500 people participated during the pandemic. Surveillance 
of influenza-related web queries on a medical advice website 
[14] was conducted via an automated system that used 
statistical modelling to estimate the proportion of patients 
with influenza-like illness also described in detail elsewhere 
[15,16]). Other systems used in Sweden included aggregated 
voluntary laboratory reporting of the number of samples 
analysed for influenza virus infection and the proportion 
positive, voluntary reporting of severity of influenza illness 
from a register within intensive care departments called 
‘Intensive care of influenza cases in Sweden’ (IRIS), reports 
of deaths from pathologists and the official death registry, 
and weekly reports on use of antivirals and vaccine coverage 
from the county medical officers (Smittskyddsläkarna) of the 
Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control (SMI) . 
Ireland
In Ireland, the web-based ‘Computerised Infectious Disease 
Reporting’ (CIDR) information system was used [4]. This is a 
shared national information system for the regional health 
departments, the Ministry of Health, the Health Protection 
Surveillance Centre and other partners. 
Finland
In Finland, several surveillance systems were used [17]. 
These included the national infectious disease register, 
notifications of clusters of influenza (via doctors responsible 
for communicable disease control in healthcare districts); 
influenza-like or influenza-related illnesses reported by 
selected primary healthcare centres in all healthcare districts, 
case-based surveillance (including details of symptoms and 
recent travel), hospital surveillance (daily number of patients 
hospitalised and total number of inpatients in general wards 
and in intensive care units with confirmed or suspected 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection), virological surveillance 
and mortality surveillance.
a Respondent countries that adapted a pre-existing case register 
before the influenza pandemic.
Box 2
Overview of case registration systems, provided by five 
respondents in Group 2a, survey on case registry systems 
for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Europe,  
June–July 2010
We collected individual data on everyone who was swabbed in 
our country during the pandemic. We had a separate database 
for those who required antivirals and those who took the 
influenza vaccine and also for our sentinel surveillance.
We connected our notification system with the (central 
and peripheral) laboratory systems, together with the 
questionnaires that were developed for studies among patients 
and contacts.
 
We had several systems for different purposes and times. The 
First Few 100 (FF100) database was for detailed follow-up 
of 392 cases and their contacts (this was an online Postgre 
SQL database [18]). Along side this, we had a less detailed 
national dataset (the ‘Whiteboard’) of all confirmed cases 
which occurred (e.g. all FF100 cases were on the Whiteboard 
but not vice versa), this was initially an Excel spreadsheet 
until an online SQL database could be built. This housed data 
until 1 July 2009 when we stopped our containment phase. 
Case data was also on another on-line system (which had 
been developed and rolled out to local health protection 
teams during the containment phase so ran in parallel to the 
Whiteboard for a while). This included discarded (negative) 
cases and was also used for case management locally.
Our case tracking system consisted of (a) notification of 
laboratory-confirmed severe cases who were hospitalised 
(b) laboratory reporting of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09  cases, 
(c) sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness, including a 
clinical and a laboratory component.
Multiple sources for the first 200 cases: communicable disease 
web-based reporting system NAKIS. Laboratory reporting 
system, sentinel providers reporting system and hospital 
admission system were additional.
a Respondent countries that developed a new case register before 
the pandemic.
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to the national case register database, and another 
reported using for cases of severe acute respiratory 
infections), Microsoft Access (n=2, which was report-
edly used for collecting data on enhanced surveillance 
of pandemic cases in intensive care units, for monitor-
ing all cause deaths, pneumonia and influenza deaths, 
and for monitoring sentinel general practice ILI and 
virological surveillance), Microsoft Word (n=1) and a 
paper-based system (n=3), which one country reported 
for a few weeks at the very outset of the pandemic in 
their country.
Countries with no pandemic influenza 
case register pre-pandemic (n=6)
Six countries had no pandemic influenza case regis-
ter in place before the first case of influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 was confirmed in their country. The systems 
used instead included Microsoft Word (n=3), Microsoft 
SQL (n=1), a paper-based system (n=3), Microsoft 
Access (n=1) and Voozano [19] (n=1). Respondents’ 
brief descriptions of the systems used are shown in 
Box 4.
Suggestions for future pandemic case registers 
Respondents were asked what they would change 
about the way cases were tracked when developing 
a system for a future pandemic. In countries where 
an existing national system was adapted (n=6) there 
were few suggestions for improvement, but one com-
ment was ‘Incorporate a contact tracing functionality 
for early cases in the containment phase’. In countries 
developed a new system pre-pandemic (n=11), com-
ments predominantly related to simplification of the 
reporting forms and automatic data collection (Box 5). 
Usefulness of a standardised case 
register developed at EU level
Finally, respondents were asked if they would find it 
useful if a standardised case register template was 
developed at the European level for use in future pan-
demics. Of the 23 respondents, 17 thought that this 
could be useful, with one respondent noting that it 
would allow comparison of information between coun-
tries and evaluation at EU level, and another that if 
such a register was also compliant with WHO require-
ments, it could avoid double reporting. However, some 
respondents expressed reservations (Box 6).
Discussion
In this paper, we describe the case registers developed 
before and during the influenza pandemic in European 
countries in order to support planning for case regis-
try systems for future pandemics. Not surprisingly, 
countries that made use of a pre-existing, standard-
ised national computerised surveillance tool that was 
pretested, live and ready for use before the pandemic 
reported relatively few problems and five of six such 
countries used their system without modification. In 
countries that started to develop a new system before 
the pandemic, five were live and ready for use by the 
time WHO declared a pandemic and a further five were 
ready by the time the first case was confirmed in their 
country. 
All countries with an operational system in place pre-
pandemic reported that the system was designed to 
meet a variety of control and strategic objectives, with 
a clear emphasis on national monitoring. Countries 
that developed a new system were less likely to report 
prevention or reduction of morbidity and mortality as 
a strategic objective than countries with a well-estab-
lished surveillance system, although we were unable 
to investigate this further. 
Even at national level, the process seems to have been 
complicated, with new systems incorporating data 
from multiple sources in multiple formats. Seven coun-
tries had to modify their system, mainly because it was 
Box 3
Reasons for modifying or abandoning the case registration 
systems in place before the pandemic, provided by seven 
respondents in Groups 1 and 2a, survey on case registry 
systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in 
Europe, June–July 2010
The system was too complex to use, users were not familiar 
enough with system.
The system crashed after the inclusion of around 20 suspect 
cases (so actually before the first confirmed case). Problem 
was that it had been tested for around 10 cases, that worked 
fine, but after 20 it technically shut down due to the overload 
of information. Too complex, too slow.
It was not flexible to changing demands.
At the beginning of the pandemic we developed a system for 
epidemiological investigation of every confirmed case. After 
the first 1,000 cases it was impossible to manage contact 
tracing of all confirmed cases and we adopted a more simple 
form to be filled in only for confirmed cases that were to be a 
fraction of ILI cases diagnosed by hospitals and GPs.
The continuation of enhanced surveillance of influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09, including contact tracing around cases, 
would be inadvisable as case counts increased. Under such 
circumstances it was exceedingly difficult to maintain this 
practice, and its public health benefit was doubtful. On 
15 July 2009 we moved to a mitigation phase, which was 
communicated as ‘patient protection phase’. In this phase, 
contact tracing was discontinued and the recommendation 
for chemoprophylaxis of all close contacts was withdrawn. 
Surveillance shifted to: a) notification of laboratory-confirmed 
severe cases who were hospitalised, b) laboratory reporting 
of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09  cases, (c) sentinel surveillance 
of influenza-like illness, including a clinical and a laboratory 
component.
Modifications had to be made due to the gap of reporting 
demands of WHO and ECDC.
The necessity to include additional indicators.
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; GP: 
general practitioner; WHO: World Health Organization.
a  Group 1: respondent countries that adapted a pre-existing case 
register before the influenza pandemic. Group 2: respondent 
countries that developed a new case register before the 
pandemic.
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too complex, difficult to manage, inflexible or system 
users were not familiar with it. In one country, the new 
system was abandoned due to its incapacity to handle 
large amounts of case data. In some countries where 
the recording systems had not been developed before 
the pandemic, attempts were made to develop a com-
mon tool, but time and financial pressures seem to 
have been a limiting factor. 
Clear themes emerged as to how international moni-
toring and communication could be improved and 17 
respondents agreed that a standardised case register 
template developed at European level would be use-
ful. The respondents suggested firstly, use of a lim-
ited number of simple standard variables, specified 
in advance and agreed between WHO and ECDC (to 
ease data collection requirements) and secondly, a 
distributed or web-based data collection tool (to facili-
tate data transfer to WHO and ECDC and inter-country 
comparison). 
The efficiency of electronic data transmission during 
the international severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak in 2003 has previously been described 
[20]. Krause et al. also advocate (and respondents in 
our survey largely agreed) that flexible, scalable sys-
tems, capable of coping with large quantities of data 
must be available to deal with new global epidemics 
as the characteristics of the disease, the organism and 
Box 4
Brief description of case registration system provided by 
four respondents in Group 3a, survey on case registry 
systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in 
Europe, June–July 2010
We had no system - we could not succeed in developing a 
common tool … The questionnaire was based on [that provided 
by] WHO (not adapted to the situation) and was too long. When 
it was ready it was no longer useful. Instead we used Excel and 
then relied on sentinel surveillance.
Primary health centres reported to the regional Public Health 
centres, which further reported to the national level.
Before the pandemic, we worked on a tracking system and 
were waiting for funds to set it up. It helped us to set up a 
system in few days. The database could then be shared by 
national and local representatives of the institute and with 
major partners. Therefore management of cases and analysis 
in real time could be done with the same tools. 
We did not have a case tracking system during the pandemic. 
To register the cases we used the WHO form for case-based 
data collection. This form was filled in by hand and was sent 
back by fax from Ministry of Health.
WHO: World Health Organization.
a Respondent countries with no pandemic influenza case register 
in place pre-pandemic.
Box 5
Suggestions for improving case registration systems 
in countries that experienced difficulty with their 
system during the influenza pandemic, provided by 15 
respondents in Groups 2 and 3a, survey on case registry 
systems for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in 
Europe, June–July 2010
Simplify the form at the beginning.
 Develop a separate simpler system (fewer variables), different 
from the one we used.
Develop a much simpler system, because it’s very likely 
that you have to adapt your system anyway. MS Access will 
probably be enough. Merging of datasets can be done as you 
go along, you don’t have to prepare all this automatically in 
advance.
It will be useful to use [a] standardised case register template.
Standard variables with in-built validation rules, easier linkage 
between systems.
It would be better to have had a dedicated outbreak database 
already in existence. Setting up a database for use at such 
short notice was not ideal.
Making it automatically fed, not manually.
What would have helped if the information could have just 
been transported to WHO/ECDC data bases with just a click of 
a button.
We would use web based system only (not paper based).
We need to have the national legal basis in place beforehand. 
We would want to integrate a system for surveillance of serious 
cases, including hospital admissions and deaths.
I would design a standard tool for the whole country – I would 
not record cases in Excel again.
Reporting forms should be ready beforehand. Population 
based surveillance to get data must be more firmly established 
beforehand. A vaccination register for continuous follow up of 
efficacy and side-effects is a must.
In our small country our system worked efficiently enough 
for tracking the cases, just the computer-based data transfer 
would be simpler. There are plans to include the creation and 
introduction of computerised data flow system for influenza to 
the national influenza plan.
It would be better to have had a dedicated outbreak database 
already in existence. Setting up a database for use at such 
short notice was not ideal.
I would like to use a web based information system for tracking 
the cases.
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; MS: 
Microsoft; WHO: World Health Organization.
a Group 2: Countries that developed  a new case register pre-
pandemic. Group 3: countries with no pandemic influenza case 
register in place pre-pandemic.
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the outbreak emerge. Not all respondents in our sur-
vey, however, were convinced that a common register 
would be easily implementable, pointing to the differ-
ent requirements and capacities of countries’ health-
care systems locally and nationally, and at EU level, 
and the lack of data comparability between countries 
within existing systems.
There were a number of limitations in this study: firstly, 
the questionnaire was distributed in English, and 
there may have been issues with interpretation and 
response (although the questionnaire was pretested 
with a number of colleagues across Europe for whom 
English is not their first language). Secondly, it would 
have been useful to define direct and indirect costs 
related to staffing and resources required to operate 
and maintain different systems, but given the lack of 
any standard measure, we were unable to obtain this 
information. Finally, it remains unclear why countries 
internally experienced such surveillance difficulties. 
These could have been due to pressure on staff, as 
other essential services had to be maintained. Or there 
may have been excessive or unclear expectations by 
local or national managers and decision-makers, or it 
may reflect inherent deficiencies within the case-reg-
ister system. Also, in relation to international monitor-
ing and communication, although respondents clearly 
felt the process needed to be simplified, we did not 
ascertain what their expectations at the European level 
would be and why. These are clearly issues that war-
rant further investigation. 
Overall, respondents saw the value of pre-pandemic 
planning and standardisation of data collection and 
data linkage at the national level at the very least. 
Given the wealth of experience gained in this pan-
demic, intra- as well as inter-country working groups 
could facilitate information exchange and improved 
interoperability between systems in the future. Also, 
given the requirement under the International Health 
Regulations (2005) [21] that countries report certain 
disease outbreaks and public health events to WHO, 
and given the partnership between EU Member States, 
European Economic Area (EEA)/European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries and ECDC [22], clear 
objectives for monitoring of influenza at EU level with a 
minimum set of indicators should be agreed.
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Box 6
Concerns expressed by eight respondents regarding 
development of a standardised case register at European 
Union level, survey on case registry systems for pandemic 
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Europe, June–July 2010
Four respondents thought it could be useful
[It] depends on what it will contain. We don’t need it but for EU 
standardisation we need case definitions and guidance as to 
data validation, to get comparable data.
Yes, potentially useful. However, it will need to be flexible to 
adapt rapidly and in a short space of time to the characteristics 
of the new emergent flu organism identified.
Yes but unfortunately, different administrative level authorities 
often demand more specific tools.
Yes, providing that it would be possible for us to adapt it.
Four respondents did not think it would be useful
Probably not. We want the system to be integrated with our 
already existing systems.
Personal opinion: generally preferred, but in reality not 
feasible, and at the end: you would not gain comparable data 
because of the different health systems.
Not totally convinced.
Not necessary, each country should develop its own depending 
on its capacity and local conditions.
EU: European Union.
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